The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment dated May 26, 2026, addressed several issues under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”), including the validity of an arbitral mandate extended without formal written consent, compliance with natural justice, and the scope of corrective powers under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act.
The case involved the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board (“the Board”) and Saryu Plastics Pvt. Ltd. (“the Company”), a PVC pipe manufacturer. The Board had awarded rate contracts to the Company in 1998 and 2000 but later blacklisted the Company after an audit found excess payments. More than a decade later, in April 2012, the Parties entered into an Arbitration Agreement appointing a Sole Arbitrator with a mandate of six months. This was followed by a lengthy and troubled arbitration lasting over three and a half years, almost entirely as a result of the Board’s repeated failure to file replies, appear at hearings and to comply with the Arbitrator’s directions. The mandate was renewed on several occasions, first by mutual consent and later unilaterally by the Arbitrator, without any objection from the Board. When a hearing finally was scheduled in October 2015 – at the Board’s own request – it again failed to appear. The Arbitrator heard the matter and rendered an Award on October 27, 2015, partly in favour of the Company. Only then did the Board raise the objection that the mandate of the Arbitrator had already expired. The Company also filed a review petition seeking that “compound interest” may be substituted for “simple interest” in the Award for the pendente lite period – an amendment which increased the Board’s liability from about 3.16 million USD to 15.08 million USD. This substitution was allowed by the relevant Court and was confirmed by the High Court of Gujarat. Both these decisions were challenged by the Board before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has now ruled on three fronts. First, on expiry of mandate, the Court held that there was no statutory provision in effect at the relevant time requiring an extension to be in any specific written form. The Court held that the Board had participated in the entire proceedings without ever raising an objection and had therefore tacitly consented to the extensions. The Board is estopped from challenging the Award on this ground by its silence and raising the issue only after an unfavourable Award. Second, on natural justice, the Court found that the Board was given sufficient opportunity over three-plus years to participate, file pleadings and address the Arbitrator and that the Board’s own delays had resulted in the protracted proceedings. Now it could not turn that around to a grievance. Third, on Section 33(1)(a), the Court reaffirmed that this provision only permits correction of computational, clerical, or typographical errors. Replacing “simple interest” with “compound interest” was not fixing a slip of the pen – it was altering a deliberate finding on the merits, which was well beyond the Commercial Court’s jurisdiction.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the modification to the Award and restored the original grant of simple interest at 21.675% per annum for the pendente lite period. The appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs.
Srijoy Das, IDI Country Expert for agency and franchising in India
Sarthak Sharma