FRANCE: Commercial Court ruling illustrates increasing interaction between private franchise disputes and public economic enforcement.

Olivier BINDER | FRANCE | 15 December 2025

Olivier BINDER

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On 3 July 2025 (Tribunal des affaires économiques. Rennes, 1st Chamber, no. 2023F00454), the court admitted the admissibility of a collective action initiated by the Association des Franchisés du Groupe Carrefour (AFC) and joined by the French Minister of Economy.

The case provides a useful lens through which to examine how French Courts seek to balance freedom of contract with fair dealing in vertical relationships, particularly within complex franchise networks.

While the court has not yet ruled on the merits, this procedural decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it confirms that a franchisee association may collectively bring claims alleging contractual imbalance against a franchisor. Second, it highlights the Minister’s power to intervene directly in private commercial litigation when public economic interests are at stake.

1 – The legal framework: the concept of “significant imbalance”

The central legal basis of the dispute lies in Article L. 442-1, I, 2° of the French Commercial Code, which prohibits any party to a commercial relationship from subjecting or attempting to subject its partner to “obligations creating a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties.”

This concept allows courts to review contractual terms between professionals where bargaining power is uneven. Unlike abuse of economic dependence, which focuses on market structure, the significant imbalance test is contractual in nature: it examines whether certain clauses unjustifiably favor one party in light of the contract’s overall economy.

Typical examples include clauses that allow one party to unilaterally modify terms, impose disproportionate penalties, or deprive the other of any real negotiation power. Sanctions may include nullity of the offending clauses, restitution, injunctions to cease the practice, and civil fines up to 5 million euros, or 5% of the offender’s net turnover in France for the most recently closed financial year since the year preceding the implementation of the practices.

What makes this regime distinctive is that enforcement is dual: victims can sue before commercial courts, but the Minister of Economy may also act ex officio (Article L. 442-4). This public power reflects France’s hybrid model of contract regulation through both private and public enforcement.

2 – The Minister’s intervention : a rare use of public enforcement in franchise disputes

In June 2024, the Minister exercised this prerogative by intervening voluntarily in proceedings already initiated by the AFC against several Carrefour Group entities. The Minister argued that the contractual framework imposed on franchisees amounted to systemic imbalance and undermined entrepreneurial autonomy.

Under Article L. 442-4 of the Code de commerce, the Minister can bring or join actions “to protect the proper functioning of the market” and may seek not only the nullity of clauses, but also injunctions and civil fines. In this case, the Minister requested:

  • The annulment of several allegedly unbalanced provisions,
  • An order to cease the practices under penalty,
  • A civil fine of €200 million, and
  • Publication of the judgment in national media.

This intervention is exceptional in the field of franchise law, where disputes are usually confined to private litigation between franchisors and franchisees. It signals the State’s willingness to treat certain contractual practices not merely as private disagreements but as issues of public economic policy, reflecting concerns over fairness, market access, and competition.

3 – The Rennes decision: a procedural step, not a substantive ruling

The 3 July 2025 judgment of the Rennes Commercial Court did not rule on the merits of these claims. The decision addressed only procedural admissibility: it confirmed that both the franchisee association and the Minister had standing to sue and that the court was competent to hear the dispute, despite the existence of arbitration clauses.

The defendants, several Carrefour entities, had raised multiple objections, arguing lack of standing, prescription, and the binding effect of contractual arbitration provisions. The court rejected these defenses, holding that the collective action was properly brought and that public interest justified the Minister’s intervention.

While limited in scope, the decision is procedurally important: it sets a precedent confirming that collective representation of franchisees and public intervention can coexist within the same litigation framework. The substantive assessment of the alleged contractual imbalance remains pending.

4 – The contested franchise structure

The franchise model under scrutiny is the so-called participative franchise, combining contractual and shareholding links. Each franchised store operates through a local company in which the franchisee owns 74% of the capital, while group subsidiaries hold the remaining 26%, a minority but blocking share.

This model is coupled with a network of interrelated agreements: franchise contract, exclusive supply agreement, shareholders’ pact, and company bylaws that include brand use obligations.

The claimants alleged that this system deprived franchisees of genuine independence. Among the disputed clauses were:

  • de facto mandatory resale prices,
  • exclusive supply obligations,
  • non-compete and non-affiliation clauses,
  • a statutory obligation to operate under the franchisor’s brand, and
  • pre-emption and valuation mechanisms limiting the franchisee’s ability to sell shares freely.

Taken together, these provisions were said to create an “indivisible contractual ensemble” generating the prohibited significant imbalance.

5 – Analysis: between private autonomy and public regulation

From a comparative standpoint, this case exemplifies the French approach to fairness in B2B contracting, an area where France diverges from common law jurisdictions. Whereas Anglo-American systems rely on unconscionability or good faith doctrines, the French déséquilibre significatif provides an explicit statutory mechanism for rebalancing professional contracts.

The involvement of the Minister of Economy adds a public dimension : the State can act not merely as a regulator but as a litigant in commercial disputes. This hybrid model reflects France’s long-standing policy of public oversight over market relations, particularly in distribution and franchising, where asymmetries of power are common.

Yet, the Rennes decision should not be overstated. It remains a procedural ruling, not a finding of liability. The question of whether the franchisor’s practices indeed produce a “significant imbalance” will depend on factual and economic analysis in later stages.

Nonetheless, the decision has a signaling effect: it encourages scrutiny of franchise structures that combine contractual control with capital participation, raising questions about the true independence of franchisees in integrated networks.

Beyond the Carrefour proceedings, French courts are increasingly faced with coordinated though not formally collective, actions brought by groups of franchisees.

A notable illustration is the judgment of the Lille Métropole Commercial Court dated 16 May 2024, in which several former « Jules » franchisees, represented by the same counsel, jointly challenged the validity of various franchise clauses on grounds of “significant imbalance,” abuse of economic dependence, and anti-competitive practices.

Despite the concerted nature of the claims, the tribunal dismissed all franchisee arguments, confirming that the contractual framework of the « Jules » network remained balanced and that none of the disputed provisions infringed Article L. 442-1 of the Commercial Code.

The court reaffirmed that a network’s operational cohérence, including control over brand use, and product mix forms an essential component of the franchisor’s know-how and does not, in itself, amount to domination or subjection.

This case highlights a growing judicial distinction between legitimate network discipline and unlawful constraint, a distinction favorable to franchisors seeking to preserve brand integrity and commercial consistency.

This case is currently pending before the Court of Appeal.

6 – Outlook and implications

The judges, however, explicitly recognized that Carrefour had acted in good faith in defending its contractual model and rejected the AFC’s claim of abusive litigation.

The decision therefore remains strictly procedural: the court has neither examined nor ruled on the alleged contractual imbalance.

Carrefour has since lodged an appeal, which means that the substantive examination of the case, on the alleged “significant imbalance” and the validity of the disputed clauses, will not take place for several months, or years …

This procedural stage nonetheless confirms the broad admissibility of both collective franchisee actions and ministerial interventions under Article L. 442-4 of the Commercial Code.

Until a judgment on the merits is rendered, the case primarily serves as a test of procedural architecture rather than substantive liability, illustrating the coexistence of private litigation and public enforcement in French franchise regulation.

More broadly, these developments must now be read in light of the Rouen Court of Appeal’s ruling of 23 October 2025, which fully upheld the legality of Carrefour’s participative franchise system.

By confirming that a minority shareholding exercised in the common interest of the joint-venture does not constitute abuse, the Court reinforced the legal certainty of participative franchise structures.

Together, the commercial Court decisions in Lille, Rennes, and Rouen point toward a consistent trend : French courts are consolidating a pragmatic and balanced jurisprudence that safeguards both contractual freedom and the integrity of franchise networks.

Olivier Binder, IDI Country Expert for franchising in France

Marion Raes

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